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ABSTRACT 
 
A great body of knowledge exists on the theory of auctions and competitive bidding that is of 
potential relevance to construction contract tendering.  Most of this, however, contains 
assumptions – such as perfect information – that are unlikely to be tenable in practice.  The aim, 
therefore, is to examine the effects of relaxing some of the more restrictive of these assumptions to 
align more closely with the construction tendering situation.  In particular, the effects of additive 
and multiplicative (scalar) mark-ups in equilibrium are examined for first and second price 
auctions in situations where bidders have different, uncertain, costs.  This is illustrated firstly by 
Monte Carlo simulation – by which bids generated randomly from a normal distribution for six 
bidders and mark-ups applied systematically for each bidder in turn until equilibrium is reached. 
An extensive numerical analysis is then applied to obtain equilibrium results for both mark-up 
values and expected profit from the simple symmetric case through to more complex asymmetric 
cases for the uniform and normal distributions.  In general, it is found that first price auction 
bidders with relatively high cv levels and a larger number of bidders involved bid higher in 
equilibrium but can expect little profit unless the number of bidders involved is small.  Where 
there are asymmetries, stronger bidders (i.e., those with lower costs and less variability) bid much 
higher and achieve much higher profits in equilibrium.  From the seller’s point of view, it is 
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cheaper, in equilibrium, to have a homogeneous group of low variability bidders.  The work 
contributes to the body of knowledge on the economic theory of auctions by closing some of the 
gap between theory and practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
While the practice of auctioning goes back to ancient times1, the earliest academic treatments are 
relatively recent, with the contributions of Friedman (1956) from an operations research (decision 
theoretic) perspective, Vickery (1961) from a game theoretic perspective and Gates (1967) from 
what has been termed the tendering theory perspective (Runeson and Skitmore 1999).  In general, 
decision and tendering theory seek to inform bidders while game theory seeks to inform sellers.  
All three approaches have some impractical assumptions.  Decision theory (DT), for example, is 
essentially static, in that it assumes any given bidder’s opponents to bid with either a random or 
constant mark-up.  Game theory (GT) on the other hand assumes all bidders somehow always bid 
optimally irrespective of the value of their cost estimates. 
 
Of the three, progress has been dominated by the development of the game theoretic approach into 
a full-blown Bayesian-Nash equilibrium theory, now termed Auction Theory (AT), under the 
standard economic assumption of rational utility maximisation – so that now “the auction problem 
                                                 
1 Casady (1967) mentions a report by the Greek historian Herodotus, who described the sale by auction of women to 
be wives in Babylonia around the fifth century BC. 
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can be understood by applying the usual logic of marginal revenue versus marginal cost” 
(Klemperer, 1999: 312)2.  One of the major outcomes of this theoretical development has been to 
discover the equilibrium bidding strategies for independent private value (IPV) auctions.  This 
assumes an idealised form of valuation process by which, in procurement auction terms, each 
bidder estimates the costs involved perfectly accurately.  For example, Vickrey (1961) showed that 
if bidders are symmetric, that is, the resulting bids are assumed to drawn from the same probability 
distribution, the expected payment for the client/building owner in English first-price (open-cry), 
sealed-bid, second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) and Dutch (descending) auctions is the same in 
equilibrium.   
 
As an alternative to IPV auctions, in which it is assumed that bidders have perfectly estimated but 
different true costs, the common value (CV) model has been studied, in which all bidders are 
assumed to have the same, but imperfectly estimated, true costs, (eg., Wilson 1969).  Clearly, the 
private and common value assumptions are special cases of a more general model which contains 
both imperfect information and different costs for each bidder.  One version of this that has 
received considerable attention (eg., Myerson, 1981; Riley and Samuelson, 1981; Milgrom and 
Weber, 1982) is based on the idea of signals.  Here it is assumed that each bidder receives a 
private value signal (cost estimate), but allows each bidder’s value (cost) to be a function of all the 
signals (other bidders’ cost estimates).  With a suitable definition of this function in terms of the 
assumed conditional probabilities involved, Milgrom and Weber (1982) were able to develop the 
general model needed, termed the affiliated values model, by using a natural generalisation of the 
monotone likelihood ratio property commonly used in statistical models.  This provides several 
                                                 
2 The most notable contributions have come from Griesmer et al (1967), Wilson (1969, 1977), Milgrom (1979, 1981), 
Riley and Samuelson (1981), Myerson (1981) and Milgrom and Weber (1982) – see Klemperer (1999) for a 
comprehensive account. 
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equilibrium results, the most important of which is that the English auction generates the lowest 
bids followed by the second-price and, finally, the Dutch and first-price auction. 
 
Milgrom and Weber’s work, however, is concerned with the general properties of symmetric 
auction models when types (values/signals) are not independently distributed (Monteiro and 
Moreira 2006:1), making the affiliation assumption, as Milgrom and Weber point out, necessarily 
restrictive.  Although, as they say, it may accord well with the qualitative features of some 
situations, such as the sale of works of art, there are many other situations where it does not 
(Monteiro and Moreira 2006:1; de Castro 2004). In fact, de Castro (2004) is particularly critical, 
claiming the affiliated values assumption to be “very restrictive”; much more cumbersome to 
manipulate theoretically, with the monoticity of equilibrium hard to maintain; and leading to 
conclusions that are misleading if applied to reality.  In his view, a return to the search for non-
monotonic equilibria is urgently needed, citing Araujo et al’s (2003) general existence result of 
non-monotonic symmetric equilibria with independent types.  Araujo et al (2004), among others, 
have continued this work to examine multidimensional situations.  Meanwhile Lebrun (1996, 
1999) has obtained some results for asymmetric first price auctions, that is when bidders’ values 
are differently distributed, while Cantillon (2004) has considered both first and second price 
asymmetries.  Others have considered the situation where bidders receive (random) estimates of 
their private values and signals of a common value component (Bikhchandani and Riley 1991; 
Alberts and Harstad 1991; Vincent 1995; Klemperer 1998; Bulow & Kemperer 1999; Goeree and 
Offerman 1999; de Silva et al 2003, 2007).  Guth et al (2004) provide a summary of much of the 
asymmetry work.   
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To examine the theory further for construction contract auctions, we start with a version of the 
Bikhchandani-Riley situation, termed here the General Independent Values (GIV) model where 
bidders have, independently, both different costs and imperfect estimates of them.   In addition, 
unlike AT where unbounded rationality is assumed, the goal is to maximise profits by the more 
practical means of mark-up manipulation.  This involves finding equilibrium in DT-like scalar 
strategies rather than AT functions (Rothkopf et al 2003:73).   
 
Equilibrium multiplicative mark-up strategies in a symmetric common value (imperfect estimates 
but same costs) sealed bid game theoretic setting have been reported in several studies.  Rothkopf 
(1969, 1980a), for example, solves the n bidder Weibull distributed first price (FPA) situation 
analytically, while Oren and Rothkopf (1975), extend this to the situation where a bidder’s strategy 
in one auction affects his competitors’ behaviour in subsequent auctions, modelling bidding in a 
sequence of auctions as a multistage control process.  Smith and Case (1975), on the other hand, 
consider the two bidder loglogistic common value FPA situation for both pure and mixed 
(randomised) strategies, while Rothkopf (1991) also considers the n bidder common value Weibull 
FPA and second price (SPA) situations in which bidders may submit two or more bids and then 
withdraw some bids after bids are opened.  
 
For the asymmetric situation, Rothkopf (1969, 1980a) has solved the equilibrium multiplicative 
mark-up strategies for the two bidder common variance Weibull distributed FPA situation 
analytically, and the n bidder case numerically3.  No results have reported for the fully asymmetric 
imperfect estimates case, where both location and scale parameters are unique to each bidder.  
Neither have any equilibrium results been reported for scalar strategies other than multiplicative 
                                                 
3  See Rothkopf et al (2003) for references to other examples of multiplicative mark-ups in the game theory approach. 
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for either the symmetric or asymmetric situation, with the exception of Rothkopf (1980b), who 
found, analytically, the equilibrium linear (affine) FPA mark-ups in the Weibull common value n 
bidder situation. 
 
In general, therefore, it is concluded that, despite the difficulties involved in equilibrium 
asymmetric modelling with cost uncertainties, multiplicative mark-up models at least have had 
some success.  In this paper, both the equilibrium multiplicative and additive mark-ups are 
considered within a general linear mark-up strategy.  First, an example is provided describing how 
results may be obtained by straightforward Monte Carlo simulation to illustrate the simple concept 
underlying the analysis and identify some of the practical problems involved.  Next, a numerical 
analysis is undertaken for the FPA and SPA for the uniform and normal composite densities and 
the results provided for some of the more obvious regularities detected.  Finally, some practical 
observations are volunteered on the relevance of the analysis to construction contract bidding in 
practice. 
 
 
SIMULATION METHOD 
 
Analysis 
 
Fig 1 shows the FPA results of simulating 100,000 values for each 0.1% change in (multiplicative) 
mark-up values by a bidder, assuming other bidders are all bidding with the same markup as each 
other.  In this illustration, a typical construction contract auction situation is assumed in which 
there are 6 bidders in total, each drawing cost estimates from a normal distribution with 4.3% 
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coefficient of variation.  Overheads are calculated by the CIC formula converted to rebased HK$, 
with project size (HK$value) being loglognormal (mean=2.872829, sd=0.061078). 
 
To understand Fig 1, first assume all opposing bidders apply a 12% mark-up.  The expected profit 
is then recorded for the references bidder over series of reference bidder mark-up values.   The 
results of this are shown in Fig 1 as the curve marked “12%”.  The optimal mark-up, i.e., the mark-
up value that provides the maximum expected profit, occurs at the upper turning point of this 
curve at 6.7% mark-up (point A), giving an expected profit of $21.4m.   
 
Now assume all opposing bidders apply a 11% mark-up.  Again the reference bidder’s expected is 
recorded over a series of reference bidder mark-up values and plotted, this time at the curve 
marked 11%.  In this case the optimal mark-up is 6.5%, giving an expected profit of $15.5m.  Fig 
1 shows the results of this repeated for 10%, … , 5%.  Line A-B connects the optimal mark-up 
values.   
 
For the game theoretic solution the usual approach is to use the Nash criterion.  That is, the 
solution occurs where any alternative solution for any player produces a worst result overall.  This 
can be reached by trial and error as follows.  In this case, from Fig 1, assume that all bidders bid at 
12% mark-up.  Now, as mentioned above, the reference bidder can maximise his profits by 
bidding a 6.7% mark-up.  Unlike the DT approach, where competitors are assumed to be unable to 
change, the game theoretic approach assumes that all bidders know that bidding at 6.7% mark-up 
is best against competitors bidding at 12% mark-up.  In other words, it has to be allowed that all 
bidders will bid at 6.7% mark-up under the assumption that their competitors are bidding at 12 % 
mark-up.   
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Now, assuming that all bidders are bidding at 6.7% mark-up.  This will be on the line C-D.  Our 
bidder’s best mark-up now is the point on A-B at the same value of the y-axis, ie., around 8.25% 
mark-up.  Following the same reasoning then, if all bidders bid at 8.25% mark-up, Our bidder 
should bid at around 7% mark-up.  Repeating this process enough times results in convergence at 
7.4% mark-up, where no bid higher or lower by any bidder will produce a better result.  This, then, 
is the equilibrium solution and occurs where the two lines A-B and C-D intersect, in this case 
producing an expected profit of approximately $2m. 
 
Figs 2 and 3 shows the solution of the SPA.  Again A-B gives the optimal results, showing 0% 
mark-up to be optimal when competitors all bid at greater than 5% mark-up, but increasing quite 
rapidly when they bid less.  The Nash outcome (Fig 3) is 3.6%, producing an expected profit of 
$1.6m. 
 
 
Comment 
 
A few issues arise out of this illustrative analysis by simulation.  One is that the expected profit for 
some optimal mark-up values is sometimes negative.  That is, it can be an expected loss.  Of 
course, this is unlikely to be the case in a live situation as presumably bidders will prefer not to bid 
at all rather than make a loss under equilibrium4. 
 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Michael Rothkopf for pointing this out. 
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Another issue is that using Monte Carlo simulation, although very fast on a modern PC, is still 
quite time consuming (Fig 1 takes around one hour to produce).  While it is useful enough for a 
one-off auction situation with a fixed set of parameters, it is unlikely to be practicable in an 
extensive analysis aimed at identifying general relationships and regularities.  To do this 
necessarily requires a massive reduction in computing time.  In previous similar studies, the most 
popular approach to this is to derive general results by analytical means.  However, as has been 
already observed, this is seldom possible beyond the relatively simple symmetric IPV and CV 
assumptions.   
 
An intermediate approach that has been used previously with some success for more complex  
situations is numerical analysis.  This involves deriving formulae that can be solved by a means 
other than by finding the solution of a set of differential equations.  In this case, the formulae for 
calculating the expected profit is used together with numerical maximisation software from the 
Numerical Algorithms Group (NAG) Library.  The formulae developed are presented in the 
Appendix for the general linear (additive and multiplicative) mark-up case. 
 
 
NUMERICAL METHOD: SOME FPA RESULTS 
 
The Nash solution is easily found numerically by using (A.2) to first find the mark-up values, iv1~  
and iv2~  that maximise expected profit ( ) [ ]θiki EE =~  for bidder i, then finding jv1~  and jv2~  that 
maximises ( ) [ ]θjkj EE =~  for the next bidder ( )ijnj ≠= ;,,1K assuming the first bidder is using 
jv1~  and jv2~  etc, after assuming appropriate starting values.  Upon convergence, ii vv 1
*
1
~=  
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and ii vv 2
*
2
~= , etc ( )ni ,,1K= are the equilibrium mark-up values, with associated equilibrium 
expected profits, ii EE
~* = , etc. 
 
 
Additive equilibrium mark-up ( *1v ) 
 
In reality, it is most likely that the true parameters for all bidders will be different, ie., 
nμμμ ≠≠≠ K21  and nσσσ ≠≠≠ K21  (Skitmore, 1991).  However, it is of interest to see what 
the effects are of some simplifying assumptions.  The simplest of these is where the value of all 
bidders’ parameters are equal to our own, ie., nμμμ === K21  and nσσσ === K21 .  This is 
equivalent to the symmetric common value model, many of the properties of which have already 
been established for the formless bid function.  However, these are now considered here for the 
first time for the additive equilibrium mark-up, *1v , by fixing 12 =v .  Then the effects are 
considered of nμμμ === K21  while retaining nσσσ ≠≠≠ K21 .  This is followed by the 
alternative nμμμ ≠≠≠ K21  with nσσσ === K21 .  Finally, the most general case is examined of 
nμμμ ≠≠≠ K21  and nσσσ ≠≠≠ K21 . 
 
 
Common parameters (the symmetrical common value model) 
 
Fig 4 gives the results for *1v  and 
*E for the 2 bidder symmetric common value model for the 
uniform distribution for a range of σ  values.  This indicates that 3*1 σ=v  (or 2
* abvi
−=  where 
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b and a are the upper and lower supports).  This is the dominant strategy and true for any value of 
n andμ .   Also, ( )1
32*
+= nnE
σ  (or ( )1* +
−=
nn
abE ), which is true for any value ofμ .  The 
equilibrium expected revenue (client’s payment) is *R = *nE+μ  (or ( ) ( )( )12
21*
+
++−=
n
nbbnaR ) . 
 
*
1v  and 
*E  are also independent of μ  (but not n) for the normal distribution provided σ  is 
proportional to μ .  This enables the results, although additive, to be stated in more conventional 
terms as a percentage over a range of coefficients of variation ( vc ).  These are shown in Fig 5 and 
Fig 7 for *1v  and 
*E  respectively for both the normal (blue) and uniform (red) distributions and are 
true for any value of μ .  As these Figs show, the relationship between vc  and *1v  (and vc  and *E ) 
are linear with both 0*1 →v  and 0* →E  as 0→vc .  Fig 6 gives an alternative representation of 
the *1v  results for the normal distribution, showing an abnormality of values for smaller values of n 
as vc increases. 
 
 
Common μ  (the asymmetric common value model) 
 
For the asymmetric common value model, nμμμ === K21  and nσσσ ≠≠≠ K21 .  Let ( )1σ  
denote the smallest value of iσ  ( )ni ,,2,1 K=  then, for the uniform distribution, 3*1 iiv σ=  for 
iσ > ( )1σ  as with the symmetric model, while *1iv > 3iσ  for iσ = ( )1σ . This is again the dominant 
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strategy and true for any value of n and μ .   Also, *iE < ( )1
32
+nn
iσ  for iσ > ( )1σ   and *iE > ( )1
32
+nn
iσ  for 
iσ = ( )1σ  - again true for any value ofμ  ( ∑+= n
i
iER
** μ for all asymmetric cases). 
 
For the normal distribution, the only discernable trend is for the 2 bidder case, where *1v  and 
*E  
are proportional to 
j
i
σ
σ
.  That is * 11
*
1
jj
i
vv i
σσ
σ σ=  and *1*
jj
i
EE i
σσ
σ σ=  Fig 8 shows the results for jσ1  
( *1v and 
*E are the same for both bidders) for both uniform and normal distributions.  These are 
true for any value of μ . 
 
 
Common σ  
 
Similarly, where nμμμ ≠≠≠ K21  and nσσσ === K21 , 3*1 iiv σ=  for the uniform distribution  
except for the bidder with the lowest μ  value, in which case *1v > 3iσ  for that bidder.  
*
iE < ( )1
32
+nn
iσ  except for the bidder with the lowest μ  value, in which case *iE > ( )1
32
+nn
iσ for that 
bidder. 
 
For the normal distribution, the only discernable trend again is for the 2 bidder case.  Figs 9 and 10 
show the values of *1iv  and 
*
iE for a range of ji μμ − for values of σ  common to each bidder for 
both uniform and normal distributions. 
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Heterogeneous case 
 
For the complex case of nμμμ ≠≠≠ K21  and nσσσ ≠≠≠ K21 , no general results are obtainable 
except for the 2 bidder common vc  case.  Figs 11 and 12 give the results for 
*
1iv  and 
*
iE respectively for vc =0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 for a range of 
j
i
σ
σ
 values for both uniform and normal 
distributions for 1=iμ  (the results being a multiple of iμ , i.e., *1*1 iii vv i μμ = and ** iii EE i μμ = ). 
 
 
Multiplicative equilibrium mark-up ( *2v ) 
 
Common parameters (the symmetrical common value model) 
 
For the symmetric common value model, *2v  and 
*E are proportional to the coefficient of 
variation, vc .  Fig 13 gives the results for the 2 bidder situation for the uniform and normal 
distributions.  This shows 1*2 →v  as 0→vc  and 0*2 →v  as ∞→vc .  In addition, for the uniform 
distribution, 
6
3
2
1*
2 +=v at 1=vc  and 3
31*2 +=v at 2
1=vc , reaching a maximum of exactly 1.6 
where vc  is exactly 0.625.  For the normal distribution, the 3745.1
*
2 =v at 1=vc  and 
0459.2*2 =v at 2
1=vc , reaching a maximum of 2.1 where vc  is 0.59. 
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The associated expected profit is a multiple of σ , i.e., ** EE σσ =  for both uniform and normal 
distributions.  Fig 13 shows the values of *E  for 1=σ .  This indicates that 
3
* σ→E  as 0→vc  
and 0* →E  as ∞→vc .  In addition, for the uniform distribution, 3
* σ−=E  at 1=vc , reaching a 
minimum of exactly 
5
3σ−  where vc  is exactly 2
3 .  For the normal distribution, *E  reaches a 
maximum of 0.6437 where vc  is 0.202 and a minimum of -0.3057 at vc =1.408. 
 
 
Fig 14 shows the results for the n bidder situation up to 3.0≤vc  (convergence becomes highly 
dependent on starting values for n>2 at vc >0.3).   This indicates that  1
*
2 →v  for any n bidders as 
0→vc .  The associated expected profit for the n bidder situation is again a multiple of σ  and is 
shown in Fig 15 for 1=σ . 
 
 
Asymmetric model (common vc ) 
 
For the case of 2 bidders with a common vc , the 
*
2v  is proportional to their standard deviations.  
Fig 16 shows the *2v  for bidder i over a range of 
j
i
σ
σ
values where both bidders have typical values 
of vc =0.01, 0.05 and 0.10.  This suggests that ∞→*2v  as 0→
j
i
σ
σ  and vcv 21*2 +→  as ∞→
j
i
σ
σ
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(the results for 1=
j
i
σ
σ
 are given in the previous section).  Although convergence does occur for 
typical values, no easily discernable patterns of results were found for expected profit. 
 
 
NUMERICAL METHOD: SOME SPA RESULTS 
 
Additive equilibrium mark-up ( *1v ) 
 
For the uniform distribution, no second price *1v can be found except for the symmetric common 
value model with n=2, where the *1v is zero (if and only if the starting point is zero), with expected 
profit of ( ) 6
3
1
3* ii
nn
E σσ =+=  (exactly half the value of the FPA
5) and expected revenue (client’s 
payment) again of *** 2EnER +=+= μμ .    
 
Second price solutions for the normal distribution are only obtainable for the common value model 
and when the starting point is zero.  As with the first price arrangement, the *1v and associated 
expected profit values are a multiple of σ .  Table 1 shows these for 1=σ .  With the exception of 
*R , which is again *nE+μ , all results are independent of the value of μ .  It is interesting to note 
that expected profit at the SPA *1v is close to half the expected profit at the FPA 
*
1v  – equivalent to 
the known affiliation result that the SPA generates a better return to the seller than does the first 
price equivalent (Milgrom and Weber, 1982:1095). 
                                                 
5 Note that, while AT predicts the FPA and SPA to be the same for this symmetrical case, this analysis, unlike AT, is 
restricted to the profit maximisation by mark-up manipulation, which may account for the difference in outcome.  
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Multiplicative equilibrium mark-up ( *2v ) 
 
No numerical results were obtained due to failure to converge. 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Being the first time such an analysis has been undertaken, perhaps the first and most important 
result of work detailed here is that there any results at all!  Unlike the “higher” analysis (Rothkopf 
and Harstad 1994) for conventional analytical approach in AT, being reduced to obtaining 
numerical solutions is an uncertain business.  First there is the problem of finding suitable starting 
values.  Using standard minimising software routines, as has been done here, can make this a 
sensitive issue as was often the case for the 2>n , and for all the SPA analyses attempted.  Next 
there is the problem of suboptimal solutions and failure to converge.  In several cases the iteration 
loops around a ‘strange attractor’, fluctuating between two or three values for each bidder.  
Perhaps most important of all is the possibility of errors in the computer program.  There is a 
profound lack of earlier analyses results upon which to carry out replication tests.  In the end, it 
was possible to adapt the program to replicate some of Maskin and Riley (2000) and Li and 
Riley’s (1999) asymmetric IPV results although only in a limited way as they use bid functions 
rather than the scalar strategies used here.  As a further precaution, the integration routines were all 
subject to intensive testing by Monte Carlo simulation. 
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Turning to the results themselves (Table 2 provides a summary), it is clear that a good number of 
‘solutions’ are obtainable for the FPA symmetric and n=2 situations, with the uniform distribution 
in particular providing some elegant-looking relations that can surely be derived analytically.  This 
is not surprising as the usual analytical approach is to start with the 2 bidder symmetric uniform 
situation before moving on to the n bidder situation, followed by a distribution free treatment (the 
asymmetric situation is often intractable). 
 
Of course, for generality, the results have been obtained for a wide a range of parameters as 
possible.  Construction contract bidding, however, is concerned with a more restricted range. The 
coefficient of variation, for example, is generally taken to be around 0.05 to 0.10 for construction 
bidding (Skitmore 1989: Table 7.2).  Within this narrower range, the symmetric FPA results 
suggest the cv to be rather more important than the number of bidders, with *1v  ranging between 7-
11% for 2-30 bidders at 05.0=vc  to 15-22% for 2-30 bidders at 10.0=vc  (Figs 5 and 6) for the, 
with a similar order of magnitude for *2v  (Fig 14).  The opposite effect occurs with the associated 
expected profit, however, where *E is always small for a large number of bidders, irrespective of 
cv .  For a small number of bidders, *E  becomes significantly higher generally irrespective of cv 
for the multiplicative mark-up (Fig 15) but only for larger cv values for the additive mark-up (Fig 
7)   In terms of the differences between the uniform and normal assumption, the *1v  for the uniform 
with any number of bidders is approximately the same as that for around eight normal bidders, and 
quite similar to the normal *E (Fig 7).  The *2v  for the uniform on the other hand, is generally quite 
similar when a higher number of bidders is involved, which is the reverse of the situation for the 
normal distribution (Fig 14) 
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It is not possible to judge the effect of the number bidders in the asymmetric situation as no trends 
were observed for 2>n .  For the 2 bidder situation though, the advantage of one (stronger) bidder 
having a smaller mean or variance is very much pronounced in the *1v and 
*E  values (Figs 9-12), 
with the results for the uniform and normal being very similar for common variance (Figs 9-12) 
but with the uniform *1v and 
*E always being higher than the normal equivalent for the common 
mean (Fig 8).  Similarly, the *2v  results for the stronger (lower variance) bidder are also very 
striking (Fig 16), with the cv level being much more important for the higher variance bidder. 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has presented some numerical equilibrium additive and multiplicative mark-up results 
for the uniform and normal 1st and 2nd price construction contract auctions, in which bidders are 
assumed to have both different costs and imperfect estimates of them.  Overall, and bearing in 
mind the limitations mentioned below, it is clear from this analysis that FPA bidders with 
relatively high cv levels and a larger number of bidders involved bid higher in equilibrium but can 
expect little profit unless the number of bidders involved is small.  Where there are asymmetries, 
stronger bidders (i.e., those with lower costs and less variability) bid much higher and achieve 
much higher profits in equilibrium.  From the seller’s point of view, the implications are equally 
clear.  It is cheaper, in equilibrium, to have a homogeneous group of low variability bidders – a 
result anticipated by Flanagan and Norman (1985), which they interpret as implying the need for 
good quality of information to bidders experienced in the type and size of contract under auction 
(p.159). 
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There are also indications that the use of SPA and greater numbers of bidders may also be 
beneficial to sellers, but the analysis is quite limited in this respect – particular as the cost of 
bidding has not been included.  Other well known limitations of equilibrium analysis are worthy of 
mention.  A major issue is that bidders might not behave optimally (Flanagan and Norman 1984: 
155-6), which raises the question of what do about this (Thaler 1988) to at least take advantage of 
the opportunity costs at stake.  As must be expected, the economic basis of equilibrium results 
assumes all bidders to be acting rationally and so such an analysis is certainly going to lie outside 
the boundary of economics.  A further important issue concerns the limitations of auction theory as 
a branch of game theory, in that the competitor behaviour is assumed to be limited only to Nash 
type responses to the optimal moves of others.  As Rothkopf and Harstad (1994) comment, many 
of the common assumptions of game theoretic models – symmetry, common knowledge, isolation, 
fixed number of bidders and unbending rules - are suspect from an applications point of view.  
Similarly, there is no allowance here for changes in market conditions (supply of, and demand for, 
contractors’ services) or the capacity of the contractors (Runeson and Skitmore 1999).  Finally, as 
has been mentioned in several seminal contributions in the construction literature (eg., Raftery, 
1991; Hillebrandt, 2000; Runeson, 2000), the extent of the uncertainties involved in forecasting 
future costs as well as the behaviour of competitors and the market in general requires contract 
bidders to devote a far greater amount of energy and resources to marketing than is currently 
admitted in the economic theory of auctions. 
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APPENDIX: FORMULAE FOR NUMERICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
Let bidders for an auction be indexed ni ,,1K=  and assume each makes a bid 
 
 iiii svvt 21 +=  (A.1) 
 
where the cost estimate is  is a realisation of a random variable iS  with composite density 
( )iiF σμλ ,+   and iv1 and iv2  are the additive and multiplicative mark-ups respectively, λ  is a 
parameter denoting the unique common value (nuisance) component of the auction (Skitmore, 
1991; Hong and Shum 2003), and μ  and σ  are the mean and variance unique to each bidder.  
Suppose each bidder knows only the values jμ , jσ  , jv1  and jv2  for all nj ,,1K=  bidders.  Let 
θ denote the vector of all these values jμ , jσ  , jv1  and jv2 .  Now, the expected profit for bidder i 
is 
 ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] [ ]( ) wins wins1 iCEiTEPE ikiik −= θθ  (A.2) 
where 
 ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) dxP
xg
xvviTE
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iik θ
θ;
 wins 21∫∞
∞−
+=  (A.3) 
with 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∫∞
∞−
= dxxgP ikik θθ ;  (A.4) 
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where ( )k  denotes the kth lowest bidder.  Assuming estimates are unconditionally unbiased 
(Flanagan and Norman 1985), the expected cost given i wins, [ ] ii iCE μ= wins . 
 
The function ( ) ( )θ;xg ik  depends on the composite density assumed.  For the Uniform density, 
where ( )321 iiiii vva σμ −+=  and ( )321 iiiii vvb σμ ++= , it can be shown that 
 ( ) ( ) ∏
≠ −
−
−=
n
ij jj
j
ii
i ab
xb
ab
xg 1;1 θ        ( )axb ≥≥  (A.5) 
(Skitmore 1989:186) and  
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for the FPA and SPA respectively. 
 
Likewise, for the Normal density, letting iiii vv μμ 21' +=  and iii v σσ 2' = , 
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for the FPA and SPA respectively. 
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The optimal value of the mark-ups, iv1  and iv2 , are then obtained numerically by finding the 
values that maximise (A.2) for bidder i6.  Repeating this procedure in turn for each bidder until 
convergence then enables the equilibrium mark-ups to be obtained. 
                                                 
6 Note that is , although known, is not necessary for this calculation. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Equilibrium results for the Standard Normal Distribution [ ]( )0== μCE  
 
 
 
 
 
 1st price 2nd price 
n *1v  ( ) ( )1, 2*11 =vvP  *E  *R  *1v  ( ) ( )1, 2*11 =vvP  *E  *R  
2 1.7725 0.5000 0.6041 1.2083 0.0000 0.5000 0.2821 0.5642 
3 1.5074 0.3333 0.2204 0.6611 0.3257 0.3333 0.1086 0.3257 
4 1.5071 0.2500 0.1194 0.4777 0.5356 0.2500 0.0596 0.2386 
5 1.5478 0.2000 0.0770 0.3848 0.6879 0.2000 0.0386 0.1929 
6 1.5954 0.1667 0.0547 0.3282 0.8063 0.1667 0.0274 0.1645 
7 1.6420 0.1429 0.0414 0.2898 0.9025 0.1429 0.0207 0.1451 
8 1.6855 0.1250 0.0327 0.2619 0.9831 0.1250 0.0164 0.1309 
9 1.7257 0.1111 0.0267 0.2406 1.0523 0.1111 0.0133 0.1200 
10 1.7625 0.1000 0.0224 0.2238 1.1127 0.1000 0.0113 0.1113 
15 1.9093 0.0667 0.0116 0.1734     
30 2.1631 0.0333 0.0040 0.1235     
 2 
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Table 2: Summary of main equilibrium results 
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Fig 1: Total expected profit ($m) for various competitors’ mark-ups (1st price) 
 
 
 5 
Fig 2: Total expected profit ($m) for various competitors’ mark-ups (2nd price) 
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Fig 3: Total expected profit ($m) for various competitors’ mark-ups (2nd price) 
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Fig 4: 2 bidder symmetric uniform FPA
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Fig 5: v1* for n bidder symmetric FPA
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Fig 6: v1* for n bidder symmetric normal FPA
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Fig 7: E* for n bidder symmetric FPA 
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Fig 8: 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common mean)
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Fig 9: v1i * for 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common variance)
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Fig 10: Ei* for 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common variance)
-50 -40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40
ji μμ −
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
E i
*
3=σ 2=σ
1=σ
 
 
 
 
 
 14
Fig 11: v1i* for 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common cv)
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Fig 12: E1i* for 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common cv)
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Fig 13: 2 bidder symmetric FPA
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Fig 14: v2* for n bidder symmetric FPA
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Fig 15: E * for n bidder symmetric FPA
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Fig 16: v2i* for 2 bidder asymmetric FPA (common cv)
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